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Free Movement of Same-Sex Partners
§ l. Homosexuality and Heterosexuality in Immigration Law
National Immigration law is restrictive. It limits the number of persons entitled to
residence. Apart from nationals of the country itself, only limited categories of
foreigners are entitled to residence. The restrictions contained in national Immigration
law use many criteria, including nationality, sex and marital Status. In combination these
criteria lead to various forms of discrimination of same-sex partners.
European law enlarges, to a certain degree, the number of persons entitled to residence.
The right to respect for family life,' for example, entails in certain circumstances a
right for certain family members to live in the same country. The citizens of the Mem-
ber States of the European Union have been given various rights to go and live in any
other Member State,2 and to be accompanied by their spouses.3 In enlarging the
number of people entitled to residence, both branches of European law have made use
of the notion of marriage and related heterosexual concepts. So it remains to be seen
whether European law can really improve the immigration rights of same-sex partners.
§ 2. Free Movement of (Marital) Status
Marriage is a queer sort of contract. It not only creates legal rights and duties between
the two spouses, but also between them and children, creditors and other third parties.
It is not only a matter of private law, but at least äs much a public law Institution: it can
be decisive for the amounts of tax to be paid and for the level of social security pay-
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1 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
2 Articles 3, 8a, 48 and 52 of the European Community Treaty.
3 Article 10 of EEC Regulation 1612/68, [1968] O J. L257/2
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ments, for acquiring residency, citizenship, etc.. It not only entails consequences pro-
vided by law, but also such advantages äs private employers and Service providers
might add: better pension rights, free travel and other spousal benefits. Its consequences
are not only material; marriage carries social and religious Status too, not to mention
its impact on the behaviour and identity of those involved.
And, to come to the point, marriage travels well. With only a few exceptions, a mar-
riage concluded in one country is regarded äs a marriage all over the world - with
consequences inside and outside private and public law. One could say that there is a
free movement ofmarital Status, not infrequently assisting the free movement of married
persons.
Although marriage may be universal and mobile, thus far it is a contract which can only
be made between a woman and a man. However, a Dutch parliamentary resolution,4
and a court case in Hawaii have now raised a question of great practical interest: Would
a marriage contracted between two people of the same sex be recognized abroad?
The relevance of a similar and related question is growing with the number of European
countries that have enacted laws on registered partnership. Finland, the Netherlands,
and other countries, seem set to follow the example of Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Greenland and Iceland. Will a registered partnership of two women or two men be
recognized in other countries?
Both questions are related to a third, which has been of vital importance for a long time
for the many lesbian and gay couples who live abroad together, or who would like to
live in the same country, or who would like to move together to another country: Is
their de facto relationship recognized internationally?
To these three factual questions a fourth, more normative question should be added:
Does European law require the recognition of same-sex marriage, registered partner-
ship, and/or unregistered same-sex relationships? By 'European law' I mean both Euro-
pean Union law and European human rights law.
§ 3. To R or not to R ?
To recognize or not to recognize, that seems to be the question. But in fact it is not.
This can be demonstrated with the example of registered partnership. Let us suppose
for one moment that European law requires that registered partnerships be recognized
throughout the European Union. Outside the countries that have introduced registered
partnership, such recognition would not be of much help to any couple who are regis-
4. Kamerstukken //(Parliamentary Papers), 1995/96, 22700, nr. 18, adopted on 16 April 1996.
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tered partners. After all, the Status of 'registered partner' does not have any conse-
quences in the domestic law of other countries, nor in European Union law, nor in
human rights law. Only in situations where domestic private international law refers to
the law of a country that 'recognises' registered partnership, would the recognition of
someone äs 'registered partner' help that person (and then only if this would not be seen
äs incompatible with national public order).5 Such references, however, do not exist
in any national Immigration law.
Therefore, any questions about the transnational recognition of same-sex relationships
need to be far more specific. In fact a whole matrix of questions need to be asked. Each
question should be related to one of seven partnership concepts used in domestic and
European law.
§ 4. Seven Partnership Concepts in Law
For the purposes of Immigration a (married, registered or unregistered) partner might
want to be included in one of these partnership concepts. If a foreigner wants to be
allowed to live in the same country äs his or her partner, he or she would hope to be
recognized äs:
a. being 'married' (in national Immigration rules 'married' partners can normally
qualify for a residence permit far more easily man unmarried partners);6
b. 'cohabitee' (living together can, for example according to paragraph Bl/3.2 of the
Dutch Immigration rules, be a ground for a residence permit; however, in the
Netherlands the additional conditions are a little stricter man those applicable to
married partners; British Immigration officers may use their discretion to admit
cohabitees, although it has been reported that a 1985 instruction guiding their
exercise of this discretion has been revoked);
c. 'registered partner' (in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greenland and Iceland regis-
tered partners have the same Immigration rights äs married partners,7 and in the
5. K. Boele-Woelki and P.C. Tange, 'De Deense wet inzake het geregistreerd partnerschap. Een voor-
beeld voor Nederland?', Nederlands Juristenblad (1989), 1543; Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira,
'Geregistreerd partnerschap en de Europese Unie', Nederlands Juristenblad (1995), 1570; K.McK.
Norrie, 'Reproduction technology, transsexualism and homosexuality: new problems for international
private law', 43 International and ComparativeLaw Quanerly (1994), 757; Bea Verschraegen, Gleich-
geschlechtliche 'Ehen', (Medien und Recht Verlags, 1994), 219-222; Lise Heide-J0rgensen, 'An
Expansion of Fundamental Rights or an Erosion of Traditional Values? A Review Essay', 3 Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law (1996), 190-196.
6. See, for example, paragraph 281 of the UK Immigration Rules of 1994 [reproduced in M. Supperstone
and D. O'Dempsey, Immigration: The Law and Practice, (Longman, 1994)] and paragraph Bl/1.2 of
the Dutch Immigration Rules, the Vreemdelingencirculaire of 1994.
7. Verschraegen, Gleichgeschlechtliche 'Ehen', 241-254.
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Netherlands they will have the same rights after the enactment of the registered
partnership bill);8
d. 'spouse' (according to Article 10 (1) of EEC Regulation 1612/68,9 the 'spouse'
of any European Union citizen working in another Member State is entitled to
residence in that country);
e. 'member of the family' (according to Article 10 (2) of Regulation 1612/68, Mem-
ber States should 'facilitate the admission' of family members of workers who are
not their spouse, child, grandchild, parent or grandparent, but only if they are
dependent on the worker, or were living under the worker's roof in the original
Member State);
f. having 'family life' with his or her partner (Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights requires family life to be respected);
g. having 'private life' with his or her partner (Article 8 of the Convention also
requires respect for private life).
When combining these seven partnership concepts with the three types of same-sex
relationships (unregistered, registered, married) we have in fact 21 questions:
Does European law require the recognition of:
I. unregistered same-sex partnership / partners
II. registered same-sex partnership / partners
III. same-sex marriage / married partners
äs:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g·
'marriage'?
'cohabitation'?
'registered partnership"
'spouses'?
'family'?
'family life'?
'private life'?
All these questions should not only be answered in the light of national laws and the
European rules mentioned above, but also in the light of the various national and Euro-
pean manifestations of the principle of non-discrimination. More than one book would
8. See Kamerstukken II (Parhamentary Papers), 1993/94, 23761, nrs. 2 and 3.
9. [1968] OJ. L257/2.
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be needed to deal with all questions in depth, and more than one test case to settle them.
Here I will briefly indicate some of the complications and possibilities.
A. RECOGNITION AS 'MARRIAGE'
The recognition of unregistered same-sex partners äs being married may seem to be the
least likely form of legal recognition. This is a mistake. As long äs registered partner-
ship is not introduced, and marriage is not open to same-sex couples, a forceful argu-
ment can be made for considering unregistered same-sex couples äs 'married'. This
argument has recently been embraced by a Dutch Court.10 It ruled that in certain
circumstances same-sex cohabitees should be treated äs if they were married. The case
involved a man from Trinidad and Tobago who had been living together for some years
with a Dutchman in the Netherlands. The man had been refused a residence permit,
because his Dutch partner had insufficient income - in fact only a small social benefit,
for he was unable to work because of AIDS. However, according to the Dutch Immigra-
tion rules, n such an income would have been considered sufficient äs a basis for a
residence permit, if the couple had been a married. Since they were not able to legally
marry (and because of their notarial cohabitation contract in which they had made an
effort to create similar rights and duties between each other äs exist within marriage),
the Court considered it discriminatory to apply the same conditions to them äs are
applicable to unmarried heterosexual couples.
The Court did not specify which manifestation of the principle of non-discrimination it
used. It could have used Article l of the Dutch Constitution (the non-discrimination
clause), or Article 429quater of the Dutch Penal Code, which makes it a criminal
offence for anyone (including Immigration officials) to discriminate (directly or indirect-
ly) against homosexuals in the performance of a public office, a profession or a busi-
ness.12 It also could have relied on the non-discrimination clause of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Article 14). However, according to the (so far disap-
pointing) case law of the European Commission of Human Rights, Article 14 allows for
homosexual partners to be treated less favourably than heterosexual partners. The
Commission has based this on the ground 'that the family (to which the relationship of
heterosexual unmarried couples living together äs husband and wife can be assimilated)
merits special protection in society' and that it 'sees no reason why a High Contracting
Party should not afford particular assistance to families'. B Perhaps the line of argu-
10. President Rechtbank Den Haag (President of the Hague District Court); decision of24 October 1995,
Migrantenrecht (1996), nr. 4.
11. Paragraph Bl/1.2, äs opposed to paragraph Bl/3.2 dealing with unmarried partners.
12. See Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States', in Kees Waaldijk and Andrew Clap-
ham(eds.),Homosexuality: a European Community Issue, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 77-81, 114-115.
13. Simpson v. UK, No. 11716/85, 14 May 1986, D&R 47, 274; cited in W.J. and D.P. v. UK,
No. 12513/86, 13 July 1987, not reported in D&R; in C. andL.M. v. UK, No. 14753/89, 9 October
1989, not reported in D&R; and in B. v. UK, No. 16106/90, 10 February 1990, D&R 64, 278; See
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ment of the Dutch Court may be used more successfully in future cases under the
European Convention.
So far Dutch courts have not had a chance to recognize registered partnership. But I
would think that the line of argument adopted by the Court in the case of the man from
Trinidad, would also apply in the case of a same-sex partnership registered in one of
the Nordic countries, and indeed in the case of a same-sex marriage contracted in,
perhaps, Hawaii. My prediction would be that for the purposes of Dutch Immigration
law, foreign registered partnerships and same-sex marriages would be treated äs
'marriages'.
B. RECOGNITION AS 'COHABITATION'
From a Dutch perspective it is always surprising to encounter legal rules which recog-
nize cohabitation, but which limit that recognition to heterosexual cohabitation.14 For
example, the instruction issued to British Immigration officers on 8 November 1985 on
the admission of cohabitees is limited to personal relationships outside marriage between
members of the opposite sex. 1S
Here the distinction is not based on marital Status, but directly on the sexual orientation
of relationships (or in other words: on the sex of the partners involved). As I said, the
European Commission of Human Rights so far accepts such a distinction. However, it
has been pointed out that the validity of the Commission's argument depends on the
assumption that homosexual couples are not 'family'.16 This may be criticized on the
same grounds äs the restrictive Interpretation of 'family life' (see below, § 4.F.). It has
also been suggested, " that the Commission's readiness to consider differential treat-
ment of same-sex and different-sex couples äs justified, is not in line with the require-
ment of 'very weighty reasons' in case of discrimination based on sex.18 In all same-
sex couple cases which have come before the Commission it could be argued that the
applicants would have been treated more favourably if either partner had been of the
other sex.
Therefore, in future cases it may be argued that the European Convention requires that
same-sex cohabitation be recognized äs 'cohabitation'.
13.-*
Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights - The United States Constitution, the Euro-
pean Convention, and the Canadian Charter, (Clarendon, 1995), 123.
14. See Waaldijk, in Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue, 93-101.
15. Supperstone and O'Dempsey, Immigration: The Law and Practice, 213. It has been reported that the
1985 instruction was recently revoked.
16. Pieter van Dijk, 'The Treatment of Homosexuals under the European Convention on Human Rights',
in Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue, 198.
17. Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, 126-129.
18. European Court of Human Rights, 28 May 1985, Abdulaziz, Series A, Volume 94, paragraph 78.
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Similar arguments may be developed to get registered partnership (or same-sex mar-
riage) at least recognized äs a form of cohabitation, in those countries that have not
introduced registered partnership (or same-sex marriage).
C. RECOGNITION AS 'REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP'
In 1995 Denmark, Norway and Sweden concluded a treaty obliging each of them to
recognize partnerships registered in the other two countries.19 Later that year the
Dutch State Secretary of Justice announced that, once the Dutch registered partnership
law has been enacted, the possibility of acceding to that Nordic treaty would deserve
consideration.20
It should be noted that there are some differences between the Nordic laws on registered
partnership, and the Dutch proposal which is now before Parliament. One of these
differences concerns the right to enter into a registered partnership. In the Nordic
countries admission to registered partnership is regulated by a very strict condition,
which has to be met by one of the partners (in Denmark, for example, at least one of
the partners must be a Danish citizen residing in Denmark; similar requirements apply
in the other Nordic countries).2I In the Dutch proposal, on the other hand, the condi-
tions themselves are less strict, but they have to be met by both partners; each partner
must have either:
Dutch citizenship; or
a valid residence entitlement. n
It has been argued that the Nordic System is contrary to EU law, because it discrimi-
nates between EU citizens on the ground of nationality. Article 7 (2) of Regulation
1612/68 23 provides that citizens of another Member State must 'enjoy the same social
and tax advantages äs national workers'. In the Reed case the Court of Justice of the
European Community held 'that the possibility for a migrant worker of obtaining per-
mission for his unmarried companion to reside with him' is a 'social advantage for the
purposes of Article 7 (2)'.24 Therefore the possibility of a migrant worker registering
19. Reported in the International Lesbian and Gay Association's ILGA Bulletin (1994, No. 3), 16.
20. Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary Papers), 1995/96, 22700, nr. 6, p. 23.
21. See Verschraegen, Gleichgeschlechtliche 'Ehen', 108, 121 and 129.
22. Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary Papers), 1995/96, 23761, nr. 9, proposed Article 80a of Book l of
the Civil Code. In the original bill of 1994 an extra requirement was proposed for any partner(s) from
outside the European Union. They would only be admitted to registered partnership after one years
residence in the Netherlands. This requirement has been strongly criticised (see Jessurun d'Oliveira,
Netherlands Juristenblad (1995), 1569), and has been dropped in the revised bill presented in the
summer of 1996.
23. EEC Council Regulation On freedom of movement for workers within the Community', [1968] O.J.
L257/2.
24. Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1303.
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a same-sex partnership in the same way äs nationale can must also be considered a
'social advantage'.2S
Since the requirement of a valid residence entitlement does not apply to foreigners who
want to marry in the Netherlands, it can be argued that the Dutch system discriminates
on the basis of sexual orientation, sex and civil Status.26
It remains to be seen whether these restrictive conditions (aimed at preventing 'registra-
tion tourism' and/or 'registrations of convenience', i.e. the registration of 'fake-partner-
ships') will survive the various lest cases which are bound to be brought.
An interesting point for discussion is, whether the Immigration authorities in countries
that have introduced registered partnership, should recognize unregistered partners of
the same sex äs 'registered partners', if these partners have no possibility to register
their partnership in their home country.
Perhaps in countries that have introduced registered partnership themselves, married
partners of the same sex will have to be recognized at least äs 'registered partners' äs
long äs the authorities are reluctant to recognize their marriage äs 'marriage'.
D. RECOGNITION AS 'SPOUSES'
The strengest Immigration rights for partners are those derived from European Union
law. EU citizens who are exercising their EU right of freedom of movement have the
right to be accompanied by their 'spouse'. For workers this is so because of Regulation
1612/68 (see above). A similar right exists for the spouses of seif employed persons,
Service providers and receivers, retired persons, students, etc..27
The Court of Justice of the EC has held that the term 'spouse' in Article 10 (1) of
Regulation 1612/68 'refers to a marital relationship only'.28 Although this was decided
in a case about a non-marital relationship between a Dutch man and an English woman,
the outcome would probably have been the same in a case concerning a homosexual
relationship.
25 Frank Emmert, 'The Family Pohcy of the European Community', m Waaldijk and Clapham (eds),
Homosexuahty a European Community Issue, 381-382, David O'Keeffe, 'Comments on the Free
Movement of Various Categones of Persons', m H G Schermers et al (eds ), Free movement of
persons m Europe, (Martmus Nijhoff, 1993), 517.
26. See Heide J0rgensen, 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparattve Law (1996), 192, for details
about a case in which the highest Danish court ruled that the law on registered partnership cannot
contain more restncted entrance conditions than those provided for marriage
27 See Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'OIiveira, 'Lesbians and Gays and the Freedom of Movement of Persons',
m Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuahty· a European Community Issue, 297.
28 Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1300
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However, it has been suggested that the time has come to reconsider Reed, and 'to find
that - given the evolution in different Member States - the meaning of the term "spouse"
has now (to be) broadened in order to encompass unmarried couples of whatever
sex'.29 Apart from this 'sociological' argument in favour of including unmarried
Partners, a functional argument has been advanced which goes to the heart of EU law:
Regulation 1612/68 is aimed at furthering the free movement of workers, and if a
worker cannot be joined by his or her partner, his or her 'volition and ability to move
within the Community will be seriously compromised'.30 An extra argument could be
based on equality äs a fundamental principle of Community law (see § 4.E., below).
In its 'Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC' the European
Parliament has also demanded that 'the füll rights and benefits of marriage' be made
available to same-sex couples.31
It would be even easier for the Court of Justice to bring registered partners under the
concept of 'spouse', than to include all unmarried partners in it. The similarities
between married partners and (same-sex) registered partners are far greater than the
similarities between married partners and (different-sex) cohabitees. Married partners
äs well äs registered partners:
are formally registered äs such (which reduces the need to establish the existence
of the relationship through factual evidence);
have the same legal obligations regarding mutual maintenance etc. (with the excep-
tion of the legal relationships to children, but that is not relevant where the immi-
gration of one of the partners is concerned); and
need to go through a formal procedure before they can sever their ties (äs opposed
to cohabitees who can split up rather more easily).
In the Reed case it had been argued (by the Dutch Government!) that 'there is no reason
(...) to give the term "spouse" an Interpretation which goes beyond the legal implica-
tions of that term, which embrace rights and obligations which do not exist between
unmarried companions'.32 In that light it can now indeed be claimed that registered
partnership is 'a well-defined and officially registered partnership, which is in no way
hampered by legal uncertainty' and therefore 'has to be considered äs on an equal
29. Jessurun d'Ohveira, m Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue,
314. See also Heide-Jargensen, 3 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1996), 185.
30. Andrew Clapham and J.H.H. Weiler, 'Lesbians and Gay Men m the European Community Legal
Order', m Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue, 42.
31 Resolution adopted on 8 February 1994, [1994] OJ. C61/40.
32. Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1302.
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footing with marital relationships, and the partners äs "spouses" '.33 Accordingly reg-
istered partners would have the immigration rights conferred by Article 10 (1) of Regu-
lation 1612/68.
In the case of a same-sex marriage contracted in one Member State, all these arguments
should not be necessary, although the Court could conceivably choose to restrict the
meaning of the word 'spouse' to its traditional heterosexual notion. However, if it did
that, the Court would be showing little respect for the national family law of that Mem-
ber State. This would hardly be acceptable, because family law still is clearly within the
domain of the Member States themselves. The only proper Option for the Court of
Justice would be to accept any marriage that is regarded äs valid in at least one of the
Member States - including a marriage between two women or two men.
E. RECOGNITION AS 'FAMILY'
As long äs same-sex partners are excluded from the concept of 'spouse', they may be
helped by the secondparagraph of Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68. This provides that
the Member States must at least 'facilitate the admission of any member of the family
not falling within the provisions of paragraph l if dependent on the worker (...) or
living under his roof in the country whence he comes'. Clapham and Weiler have
argued that a same-sex partner should at least count äs a 'member of the family' whose
admission must be 'facilitated' by the Member States according to Article 10 (2). They
not only base this on 'the human point of view' and the respect for private and family
life required by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see § 4.F and
§ 4.G below), but also on the functional argument (quoted in § 4.D above); they further
argue that because Article 10 (2) is not concerned with spouses, parents and children,
'people outside the nuclear family are to be included'.34
I would be surprised if these arguments would not convince the Court of Justice, should
a case arise in which an unregistered (or indeed registered or married) same-sex partner
Claims to be a family member for the purposes of Article 10 (2).
The problem with getting (unregistered, registered or married) same-sex partners recog-
nized äs 'members of the family' is that it does not produce a genuine right. It only
triggers an Obligation of the Member State to 'facilitate' admission.
However, the case law of the Court of Justice has repeatedly shown that in the field of
Community law the Court does not allow national measures which are incompatible with
33. Jessurun d'Oliveira, in Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue,
311.
34. Clapham and Weiler, in Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue,
41-46.
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human rights and other general principles of Community law.35 The principle of
equality is one of these fundamental principles.36
The willingness of the Court of Justice of the EC to give a generous Interpretation to
the principle of equality, has recently been demonstrated in a case of a transsexual
claiming that his/her dismissal because of his/her planned sex-change amounted to sex
discrimination. The Court agreed by considering that the principle of equal treatment
for men and women does in fact mean that there should be no discrimination whatsoever
on the grounds of sex, and that discrimination arising 'from the gender reassignment of
the person concerned' is indeed 'based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the
person concerned'.37 In this case Advocate-General Tesauro spoke of the 'universal
fundamental value, indelibly etched in modern legal traditions and in the constitutions
of the more advanced countries: the irrelevance of a person's sex with regard to the
rules regulating relations in society'.38 Any distinguishing between same-sex and
different-sex couples would of course be based ('essentially if not exclusively') on the
sex of the persons concerned. Therefore I think that the logic of the Court's judgment,
and certainly that of the Advocate-General's opinion, suggests that in EU law any
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation will now count äs a form of sex
discrimination. It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee has reached the
same conclusion äs far äs the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
concerned.39
The subject matter of Article 10 (2) of Regulation 1612/68 clearly falls within 'the field
of Community law'. Therefore its application needs to be in conformity with the prin-
ciple of equality. In the light of its judgment in Case C-13/94 P. v. S. and Cornwall
County Council,40 it seems very unlikely that the Court of Justice would exclude
equality between homosexual and (unmarried) heterosexual couples from this principle.
So a forceful argument can be made, that in the area of Article 10 (2) the principles of
Community law do not allow Member States to treat homosexual cohabitees (or regis-
tered partners) less favourably man heterosexual cohabitees. Whether the same argument
will be equally forceful to end discrimination between cohabiting homosexuals and
married heterosexuals, remains to be seen.
35. See for example Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR 2963-2964.
36. Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1769.
37. Case C-13/94 P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council Judgment of 30 April 1996, paragraphs 17 and
20-21, not yet reported.
38. Paragraph 24 of his Opinion delivered on 14 December 1995.
39. See its Views in Toonen v. Austraüa, 31 March 1994, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, paragraph 8.7.
40. P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council Judgment of 30 April 1996, not yet reported, see above.
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F. RECOGNITION AS 'FAMILY LIFE'
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees respect for 'family
life'. The European Commission of Human Rights has repeatedly held that 'homosexual
relationships' do not fall within the ambit of 'family life'.4I When it first used this
Interpretation in 1983, äs well äs when it last repeated it in 1992, the Commission said
that this was so 'despite the modern evolution of attitudes towards homosexuality'.42
This at least suggests that a different Interpretation would become possible in case of
a further evolution of attitudes.
Van Dijk has rightly criticized the Commission for not having investigated in the later
cases whether the evolution has already reached a point where the Commission should
take a different stand.43 It should be noted that the attitudes towards same-sex partner-
ship have been rapidly changing in many European countries over the last ten years. For
example, the number of jurisdictions with anti-discrimination legislation explicitly
covering sexual orientation has gone up from two to ten (Norway and France have been
joined by Sweden, Denmark, Greenland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Finland and
Slovenia). Progress in the field of same-sex partnership recognition has been made in
many countries, including all Nordic countries, France, Spain, Hungary, Belgium and
the Netherlands. M
There is also no basis for the restrictive Interpretation in any of the judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights, because the Court simply has not had an occasion
to rule on this question,4S and because the Court (like the Commission) has given an
Otherwise very extensive, autonomous Interpretation' to the concept of 'family life'.46
In contrast with the European Commission, the highest Dutch courts have already
included same-sex relationships in their Interpretation of 'family life'.47
Because of the criticism the decisions of the European Commission have generated, and
because of the growing social and legal recognition of same-sex relationships in many
European countries, a well-argued case might convince the Commission that it should
41 X and Υ v UK, No 9369/81, 3 May 1983, D&R 32, 220, Simpson v UK, No 11716/85, 14 May
1986, D&R 47, 274, C and L M v UK, No 14753/89, 9 October 1989, not reported in D&R,
Kerkhoven v the Netherlands, No. 15666/89, 19 May 1992, not reported m D&R
42 X and Y, Kerkhoven
43 Van Dyk, m Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality a European Community Issue, 190
44 See Kees Waaldijk, 'Standard Sequences in the Legal Recognition of Homosexuality - Europe's Fast,
PresentandFuture', 4 Australasian Gay & LesbianLaw Journal, (June 1994), 50, and seethe monthly
issues of the Euroletter pubhshed on behalf of the International Lesbian and Gay Association
45 Wmtemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, 111
46 Van Dijk, m Waaldijk and Clapham (eds), Homosexuality a European Community Issue, 190
47 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 19 October 1990, Nederlandse Jurisprudentte (1992), nr. 129; Afdelmg
Rechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial Division of the Council of State), 5 October 1993,
Admmistratiefrechtehjke Beslissmgen Kort (1993), nr 1117
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apply a more generous Interpretation to the concept of 'family life'. The chances of
getting registered partnership or same-sex marriage recognized äs 'family life', are
probably not much greater than the chances of getting unregistered same-sex cohabita-
tion so recognized. After all, the Commission considers both married and unmarried
heterosexual relationships äs forms of 'family life'.48
So far the European Court of Human Rights has been prevented from ruling on the
matter, because the Cornmission has declared inadmissible all applications about the
Position of same-sex couples. If the Commission keeps following this line, there will
be a major chance of a breakthrough when the present Commission and Court are
replaced by a new permanent European Court of Human Rights (äs provided by Proto-
col No. 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which could come into force
within a few years).
G. RECOGNITION AS 'PRIVATE LIFE'
Different aspects of homosexuality have been recognized in Strasbourg case law äs
being part of 'private life'. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that sexual
contact between two people of the same sex is 'a most intimate aspect of private
life'.49 The European Commission of Human Rights also considers 'affirming and
assuming one's sexual identity' äs an aspect of 'private life'.50 Therefore, not surpris-
ingly, the Commission has found in all its six cases about same-sex couples that their
relationship constitutes 'private life' too.51
All these cases involved unregistered couples. It could be taken for granted that regis-
tered and married same-sex couples would also be seen äs forms of 'private life'.
However, this quite general recognition of same-sex relationships äs 'private life' does
not mean much in the field of Immigration so far.
Firstly, in none of the cases has the Commission found an 'interference' with private
life. Ά All four Immigration cases were about the deportation of the foreign partner
of a British citizen. In the first case the Commission stated that because both partners
were 'professionally mobile' it had not been shown 'that the applicants could not live
together elsewhere than the United Kingdom, or that their link with the United Kingdom
is an essential element of the relationship'.53 In the cases of W.J. and D.P. v. UK 54
48. See Van Dijk, in Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue, 190.
49. 22 October 1981, Dudgeon, Series A, Volume 45, paragraph 52.
50. F. v. Switzerland, No. 11680/85, 1988, D&R 55, 178.
51. Kerkhoven v. the Netherlands, No. 15666/89, 19 May 1992, not reported in D&R; Simpson v. UK,
No. 11716/85, 14 May 1986, D&R 47, 274; and the four Immigration cases against the United
Kingdom, see below.
52. See Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, 103-105.
53. Xand Υ v. UK, No. 9369/81, 3 May 1983, D&R 32, 220.
54. No. 12513/86, 13 July 1987, not reported in D&R.
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and of C. and L.M. v. UK 55 the Commission ruled that the disruption of private life
by deportation ('in principle') only amounts to an 'interference' when there are 'excep-
tional circumstances'. All this is in line with the ruling of the European Court of Human
Rights in the Abdulaziz case,56 that Article 8 does not imply a general Obligation on
the Contracting states 'to accept the non-national spouses for settlement'. According to
Van Dijk, however, the Commission has been neglecting 'the homosexual factor' in
these cases: precisely because of the homosexual character of their relationship, it would
have been very difficult for the couples involved to go and live somewhere eise.57
In one Immigration case only,58 the question arose whether the interference com-
plained about was justified.59 This case was about the deportation of a gay man to
Cyprus. The Commission found that the possibility of 'hostility and social ostracism
because of bis homosexuality' did not outweigh 'valid considerations relating to the
proper enforcement of Immigration controls'. (This further proves the Commission's
neglect of 'the homosexual factor'.)
Secondly, the alternative approach of invoking Article 14 (non-discrimination) in con-
junction with the right to private life of Article 8, has so far not been fruitful with the
Commission. As I said (§ 4.A and § 4.B, above), the Commission considers less
favourable treatment of homosexual partners objectively and reasonably justified on the
ground 'that the family merits special protection in society'. So even in the context of
'private life' (a label readily attached to homosexual partnership) the exclusion of same-
sex relationships from the notion of 'family life' exerts its influence. By denying homo-
sexual couples the label of 'family life' the Commission also weakens the additional
protection that Article 14 might afford in the ambit of 'private life'.
This state of affairs might in future be overcome by getting the Strasbourg bodies to
extend the notion of 'family life' to same-sex relationship (see § 4.F, above). One could
also try to convince the Commission and the Court that in the ambit of 'private life'
same-sex partners are being treated less favourably because of the sex of one of them,
that therefore a 'very weighty reason' would be needed to justify this distinction, and
that the protection of the (heterosexual) family no longer amounts to such a reason (see
§ 4.B, above). As a third line of argument one could question the proportionality
between the refusal of residence on the one band, and the aims of protecting 'the
family' (or of controlling immigration) on the other.
55. No. 14753/89, 9 October 1989, not reported in D&R.
56. 28 May 1985, Series A, Volume 94, paragraph 68.
57. Van Dijk, in Waaldijk and Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: a European Community Issue, 191-192.
58. B. v. UK, No. 16106/90, 10 Febniary 1990, D&R 64, 278.
59. See Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, 105-110.
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§ 5. Free Movement of Partnership Status
Only being recognized (at European level) äs having a 'private life', is not a great help
for same-sex partners who want to live together in a particular European country. To
have their partnership Mly recognized in other countries, they would need to be
included in the more public concepts of partnership, such äs 'family', 'marriage',
'spouse', 'registration' or even 'cohabitation'. Strong arguments to support this inclu-
sion can be based on human rights and European Union law support, äs I have tried to
demonstrate.
A lesbian or gay couple that wants to acquire Immigration rights on the basis of their
relationship, need a public partnership Status, a partnership Status that is fully recog-
nized in public policy. Only such a public Status will move across borders reasonably
freely. Courts and other national and European law makers should make same-sex
couples eligible for such statuses - in the same way äs the law has always provided
different-sex couples with 'marriage' and other notions of partnership that travel freely
around the world. In test cases and other areas the law should be challenged to do so.
As a public Status 'marriage' would be the most effective, because it is an important
criterion in the national (Immigration) law of all countries. However, to win that Status
through parliamentary politics or test cases may be the most difficult of all, because of
its traditional, religious background. Registered partnership would be more easily
acquired, but only through legislation. The statuses of 'cohabitation', 'spouse' and
'family' have the great advantage that they can be acquired through the courts, without
first having to mobilize a parliamentary majority.
'Private life' is not enough for lesbians and gay men who have come out, publicly, who
want to live together, publicly, and who want to move from one country to the other,
publicly.
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